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ABSTRACT
Large-value payment systems (LVPSs) often have a tiered structure, whereby only
a limited number of banks have direct access to these systems, while every other
institution accesses it through agency arrangements with direct participants.As such, a
high degree of tiering is often perceived as being associated with credit and operational
risks. In this paper, we use data around five recent de-tiering events in the United
Kingdom’s LVPS (Clearing House Automated Payment System) to assess the impact
of de-tiering on these risks as well as on liquidity usage. We find that the impact of
de-tiering is largest on credit risk, where average intraday exposures between first-
and second-tier banks drop by anywhere between £0.3 billion and £1.5 billion per
bank, while the cost of insuring against the losses arising from these exposures drops
by £4 million to £19 million per bank, per year. Nevertheless, the impact of these
de-tiering events on operational risk and liquidity usage appears to be economically
small.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Large-value payment systems (LVPSs) often have a tiered structure, whereby a limited
number of (first-tier) banks have direct access to these systems and act as correspon-
dents for every other (second-tier) institution wishing to make or receive a payment
(see Figure 1). The degree of tiering in a payment system is of interest to policy
makers and regulators because of its potential effect on credit risk (between first- and
second-tier members), liquidity risk and operational risk. The Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures, for example, point out that the dependencies and risk expo-
sures inherent in tiered arrangements in financial market infrastructures can present
risks to their smooth functioning as well as to their participants and the financial
markets more broadly (CPMI–IOSCO 2012).
There is substantial variation in the degree of tiering across the world’s LVPSs.
Table 1 shows activity summary statistics for some of these systems, along with their
degree of tiering as captured by the ratio of the number of first-tier to total system
participants.1 As one can see, the United Kingdom’s Clearing House Automated
Payment System (CHAPS) is the most tiered system, while Switzerland’s SIC and
Japan’s BOJ-NET are the least tiered, with all participating banks having direct access
to them. This variation in tiering across payment systems is partly due to historical
reasons, but it may also reflect participation costs or other economic incentives along
with regulatory mandates.
In the case of CHAPS, policy discussions have highlighted the merits of reducing
the level of tiering. For example, in a recent assessment, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) stated that:
De-tiering helps address (for its part) the too-big-to-fail nature of banks and will
bring the UK more in line with international practices in, for example, the EU and
the United States, where most banks have direct access to the RTGS system.
The IMF was also of the view that “further de-tiering is needed” (Internation Monetary
Fund 2016). Although there has been an increase in the number of CHAPS direct
members (from fourteen in 2007 to twenty-six in 2017), the question remains as to
what the impact of de-tiering has been so far and whether more de-tiering would be
desirable.
Our paper is the first to use data around actual de-tiering events to quantify the
economic effects of tiering in one of the world’s largest real-time gross settlement
(RTGS) payment systems. In particular, we examine the impact of five recent CHAPS
1 Because of structural differences across different financial systems, this ratio only provides a
relative measure of tiering. For a more accurate picture, other factors may need to be taken into
account, such as the fact that some participants with direct access may still choose to operate through
correspondent banks.
Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures www.risk.net/journals
The impact of de-tiering in the UK’s LVPS 3
FIGURE 1 A tiered structure.
LVPS
First tier
Second tier
“First-tier” banks with direct access to the payment system act as correspondents for “second-tier” institutions.
de-tiering events on bank credit, liquidity and operational risks.2 Previous attempts to
assess these risks have been based exclusively on simulations. However, simulation
studies typically use models that do not capture banks’strategic behavior and therefore
are less realistic. Instead, we look at actual bank behavior around these de-tiering
events and, as such, we are able to capture equilibrium outcomes and more accurately
characterize the impact of de-tiering. In addition, we provide monetary estimates of
the expected costs associated with each of the above risks and of the way these costs
change after the de-tiering events. For credit risk, we do this by estimating what a
bank would be expected to have to pay in order to insure itself against the intraday
exposures that arise as a result of tiering. For liquidity and operational risks, we
estimate the opportunity costs of deployed liquidity and of payments that are delayed
as a result of operational outages, respectively.
Our findings suggest that the de-tiering events mostly affect the magnitude and
cost of intraday credit risk between first- and second-tier banks. More precisely, we
find that de-tiering reduces average intraday exposures, between first- and second-tier
banks, by anywhere between £0.3 billion and £1.5 billion for each affected bank.3
Maximum intraday exposures are reduced by up to £2.7 billion per bank. The associ-
ated reductions in the implied insurance premiums fluctuate between £4 million and
£19 million per bank, per year, depending on whether the bank is joining the first tier
or is a legacy first-tier one whose clients join the first tier.
In addition, de-tiering does not seem to cause liquidity costs to increase, as the
amount of liquidity deployed by first-tier banks is statistically uncorrelated with the
de-tiering events. In any case, the cost of liquidity appears to be economically small
2 For simplicity, we refer to the cost of liquidity usage as “liquidity risk” throughout the paper.
3 That is, either for a second-tier bank that joins the first tier or a first-tier bank whose clients join
the first tier.
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in CHAPS, so any further potential increases to liquidity usage due to de-tiering
are unlikely to be economically significant. Similarly, we also find that the expected
monetary cost resulting from individual bank operational outages is small, to the
extent that de-tiering can only have, in expectation, minor incremental effects on
operational risk. The other possible effects of de-tiering, such as on bank resolution,
on competition or on legal risk, are beyond the scope of our analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant
literature. In Section 3, we describe the institutional characteristics of CHAPS and
the data used in our analysis. In Section 4, we describe the methodology for assessing
the credit, liquidity and operational risks associated with de-tiering and present the
results as applied to CHAPS. Section 5 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Our paper is related to previous studies that have sought to explain the economic
rationale of tiering in LVPSs and analyze its effects on credit risk and liquidity usage.
A number of papers rationalize tiering using monitoring-efficiency arguments. For
example, in characterizing an efficient payment system, Rochet and Tirole (1996)
argue that such a system should enable bilateral intraday overdrafts similar to the ones
that exist between correspondent and client banks in a tiered payment system. This
enables the banks to take advantage of the soft information that they may have about
their counterparties and helps overcome the inefficiency in credit provision caused
by the uniformity of the central bank’s overdraft rules. Related to that, Jackson and
Manning (2007) show that a central bank can optimally require collateral for all of
the intraday lending that it does, even if only a subset of participants are safe and have
low collateral costs. This is because the riskier participants can benefit indirectly from
central bank credit by corresponding via the safe banks in a tiered structure. Kahn
and Roberds (2009) develop an explicit theory of tiering which shares elements of
that intuition. They set up a static model in which banks seek to meet their payment
obligations to each other but need to account for settlement risk (ie, the risk that
bank A makes a payment to bank B but does not receive its dues because bank B
has in the meantime defaulted). One solution is for banks to post collateral, which
is expensive. Alternatively, banks may monitor each other, and tiering is one way
to achieve this in a decentralized system, as less reliable banks settle through more
reliable ones, who act as their monitors. Chapman et al (2013) build on this intuition
in a dynamic setup. In their paper, first-tier banks observe the credit history of their
second-tier clients, which allows them to better assess their creditworthiness. This, in
turn, allows for a more efficient allocation of credit.
Given the implications of tiering on bank intraday liquidity, our paper is also related
to studies that model bank intraday liquidity management in payment networks. The
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seminal paper here is by Bech and Garratt (2003), who show that in order to minimize
liquidity costs, banks may strategically delay their outgoing payments, potentially
giving rise to socially inefficient equilibriums. Abbink et al (2017) provide laboratory
evidence of such equilibriums and show that inefficient equilibriums tend to be stable,
ie, once banks start collectively delaying payments, it is difficult to get them to change
their behavior.
Our paper is more closely related to a literature that has sought to empirically assess
the impact of LVPS tiering on intraday credit risk and liquidity usage. Unsurprisingly,
many of these studies use data from CHAPS, since CHAPS is one of the most tiered
systems in the world. Bank of England (2004a) and Harrison et al (2005) are the first
to assess the size of unsecured intraday credit exposures of first-tier CHAPS banks
toward their second-tier clients. They both find that, under normal circumstances,
these exposures are not large and, as a result, the credit risk that accrues to first-tier
banks is not material. However, there are instances when these exposures may be
larger, if short-lived. For example, Bank of England (2004a) reports that, according
to the 2003 correspondent banking survey, the largest recorded intraday exposure
to a single second-tier bank for that year was between £3.5 billion and £4 billion.
Harrison et al (2005) calculate that under more extreme assumptions, substantial
credit risk can arise. Lasaosa and Tudela (2008) employ the Bank of Finland payments
simulator (BoFPS) to see how credit risk and liquidity savings are affected when up
to seven of the smallest first-tier CHAPS banks join the second tier. They find that
an increase in credit risk arises from intraday overdrafts, along with an increase in
liquidity efficiency, but both of these effects are economically small. Similar results are
obtained by Arculus et al (2012), who also use the BoFPS, this time calibrated to the
Australian LVPS, a system characterized by very little tiering. Their simulations show
limited liquidity benefits resulting from increased tiering. The authors attribute this to
the usage of a liquidity-savings mechanism, which helps first-tier banks economize
on liquidity. Adams et al (2010) seek to understand what role liquidity costs play
in a bank’s decision to directly or indirectly access an RTGS system. These authors
assume that banks trade off a higher liquidity cost if they are on the first tier, while they
pay a flat fee to their correspondent bank, which is determined by a Nash bargaining
rule, if they are on the second tier. Calibrating this model to CHAPS data, the authors
are able to generate realistic tiering patterns, suggesting that liquidity cost is a likely
driver of tiering. Our paper adds significantly to this literature by analyzing the effect
of actual de-tiering events as opposed to running simulations. As such, our paper
provides cleaner evidence on the impact of tiering, since it makes no assumptions
about bank behavior.
Another relevant stream of the literature is that on the impact of operational inci-
dents in payment systems. Bech and Garratt (2012) show theoretically that such
incidents can render the payment system illiquid by causing participants’ behavior
Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures www.risk.net/journals
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to change. In particular, in cases of wide-scale disruptions that affect multiple par-
ticipants, banks may choose to withhold payments, which can result in a breakdown
of payment coordination and a drying-up of liquidity. Bedford et al (2004) use sim-
ulation techniques to study the impact of such outages in CHAPS. They conclude
that the system exhibits a high level of resilience, reflecting the effectiveness of the
operational risk controls that are in place and the ample amount of liquidity available
in the system. Merrouche and Schanz (2009) investigate instances of isolated opera-
tional outages, where a stricken bank is able to receive but unable to send payments.
In those instances, the bank may act as a liquidity sink if other banks continue making
payments to it. Using data from CHAPS, the authors find that during outages, healthy
banks on average reduce their payment outflows to the stricken bank by 40%. This
substantially reduces the risk of spillover from the outage, as less liquidity becomes
trapped. Benos et al (2012) estimate the expected amount and replacement cost of
forgone liquidity during such incidents in CHAPS. They find that the expected cost of
liquidity shortages is economically small (about £6000 to £7000 per bank, per day).
This is consistent with the evidence from other RTGS systems: Berge and Christo-
phersen (2012) show that while a disruption among the four largest banks of the
Norwegian settlement system (NBO) could affect the ability of other banks to make
payments, this effect is significantly reduced if banks quickly stop making payments
to the stricken bank so that it does not become a liquidity sink. Clarke and Hancock
(2013) show that the liquidity-saving features of the Australian RTGS, such as the
bilateral-offset algorithm, minimize the impact of outages by reducing the overall
reliance of the system on available liquidity.
Finally, our paper is related to a number of more recent empirical studies of bank
behavior and liquidity usage in CHAPS. While these studies do not explicitly examine
tiering, their findings on CHAPS liquidity usage are largely influenced by the high
degree of CHAPS tiering. Benos et al (2014) find that concerns about counterparty
risk, in the wake of Lehman’s default, caused some CHAPS banks to delay outgoing
payments to other CHAPS banks that were perceived as being at risk. As a result, pay-
ment coordination and recycling dropped, and CHAPS banks were forced to deploy
more liquidity to meet their payment obligations. Denbee et al (2015) show that
smaller CHAPS banks tend to provide more liquidity than larger ones relative to their
payment flows. This effect became more pronounced after Lehman’s default. Benos
and Harper (2016) show that the degree of payment recycling in CHAPS has not been
affected by the larger amount of available liquidity in the form of reserves that has
resulted from the Bank of England’s quantitative easing (QE) program. Among other
things, Benos and Harper (2016) attribute this to the high degree of tiering in CHAPS,
which makes it relatively easier for banks to coordinate their payments.
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3 INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS, DATA AND NOTATION
CHAPS is the United Kingdom’s same-day high-value payment system. CHAPS uses
an RTGS system, whereby each individual payment is settled in real time across its
first-tier banks’settlement accounts at the Bank of England. It is the only UK payment
system that guarantees real-time finality on any value, in central bank money. CHAPS
is one of the largest RTGS systems in the world, offering risk-free and irrevocable
same-day payments to meet the sterling RTGS payment requirements of its twenty-
six direct participants. CHAPS is also a critical mechanism for ensuring liquidity in
the financial markets, as it is used by banks for sterling interbank loans. Most of the
daily value processed by CHAPS is from wholesale transactions, where CHAPS acts
as the portal through which international sterling flows take place. CHAPS is used by
banks, building societies and other payment service providers to pay each other. This
includes payments for house purchases, although this represents only around 1% of
the daily value processed.4
As mentioned earlier, CHAPS is a highly tiered system. This is partly due to histor-
ical reasons and, in particular, regulatory restrictions on joint-stock banking, which
were in place in the nineteenth century. These gave the Bank of England a monopoly
on joint-stock banking, prevented other banks from expanding, and meant that country
banks needed to have a London correspondent account in order to settle payments in
London and other regions (Norman et al 2011). Another reason for the high degree of
tiering in CHAPS has to do with the status of London as a financial center, where inter-
national banks feel comfortable with corresponding banking. In addition, the technical
and liquidity costs associated with direct participation may have discouraged banks
from becoming direct members (Finan et al 2013).5
4 See http://bit.ly/2CzXE6i. For a more detailed description of CHAPS attributes, as well as those
of other RTGS systems, see Manning et al (2009). It should be highlighted that responsibility for
the CHAPS system transferred to the Bank of England in November 2017.
5 In recent years, CHAPS has reduced the costs of direct participation. There is no joining fee, and
the annual shareholder charge is split equally among participants (it is currently £18 589 per partici-
pant). In addition, a direct participant has to pay a participation charge, which is based on prior-year
volumes as well as the costs of holding a Bank of England settlement account (an ongoing £15 000
management fee plus debit item charges), and the SWIFT tariff fees (see http://bit.ly/2qroKrF).
On aggregate, these costs seem relatively moderate, even for a low-volume institution. However,
operational participation may be costly: a direct participant needs to comply with the technical and
operational requirements of the system, which predominantly relate to connectivity and compati-
bility (eg, a connection to the SWIFT payment messaging network, SWIFT interfaces), resilience,
financial stability and security. The cost implications of technical and operational requirements,
together with the credit and liquidity risk management requirements of direct participation, can
be particularly onerous for smaller players (Financial Conduct Authority and Payments Systems
Regulator 2014).
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TABLE 2 De-tiering events in CHAPS.
De-tiered banks De-tiering date
BNP July 13, 2015
Bank of New York May 19, 2014
Handelsbanken November 11, 2013
State Street September 17, 2012
Bank of America October 18, 2010
All instances of second-tier banks who joined the first tier between September 20, 2010 and February 12, 2016.
Tiering in CHAPS has often been thought to introduce unnecessary credit and
operational risks. As a result, the Bank of England has encouraged the expansion of
CHAPS membership (Bank of England 2004b; Salmon 2011). In line with this, the
number of direct members (in sterling payments) increased from twelve in 2004 to
eighteen in 2011. More broadly, the international standards set out by the Commit-
tee on Payment and Settlement Systems–Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions in the Principles for Financial Market Infras-
tructures (CPMI–IOSCO 2012) also highlighted the risks that the dependencies and
exposures inherent in tiered arrangements can create and provided guidance on how
market infrastructures could address them. As a result, in recent years, additional ini-
tiatives have been taken to further reduce the degree of tiering in CHAPS. In 2012, for
example, CHAPS introduced tiering criteria, by which indirect participants process-
ing payments above a certain threshold may be required to become direct members,
and correspondent banks were made responsible for monitoring the extent to which
their second-tier clients have exceeded these thresholds (see http://bit.ly/2CBphvO
for more details).
Our study focuses on five recent de-tiering events, whereby five second-tier banks
joined the first tier and, as a result, the number of first-tier CHAPS members increased
from seventeen to twenty-two (Table 2).6 Our sample period is from September 20,
2010 (a month before the first event) to February 12, 2016, with a total of 1365 days.
To study the impact of these de-tiering events, we use data on all payments sent
through CHAPS on a daily basis, over the above-mentioned time period.7 The data
includes information on the identities of the first-tier senders and receivers, the iden-
6 Information about the banks that have joined CHAPS in recent years can be found at www.chapsco
.co.uk/media/press-releases.
7 During this period, CHAPS was open during a ten-hour and twenty-minute window each business
day, opening for payments at 06:00. Participants are not obliged to be open for business at 06:00,
but they must be open by 08:00 and sending payments by 10:00. Since June 20, 2016, the Bank
of England RTGS, which processes CHAPS payments, has been open for an extra hour and forty
minutes, closing at 18:00 instead of 16:20.
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tities of their client banks (for payments made or received on behalf of second-tier
banks) and the value and timing of payments aggregated at one-minute intervals. The
graphic below summarizes the structure of the data:
First-tier bank i1 First-tier bank i2
Second-tier bank j1 Second-tier bank j2
P
In our analysis, we treat branches and legal entities that belong to the same parent
company as a single entity. Finally, although we observe payments by first-tier banks
on behalf of second-tier ones, we do not observe the time of the payment message
received by the first-tier banks. As such, we do not know if or for how long first-
tier banks delay the execution of their customers’ orders. Throughout, we denote by
P
OUT=IN
st .i; j / the cumulative amount paid/received by the first-tier bank i on behalf
of second-tier bank j , on day s and up to time t :
Bank i Bank k
Bank j Bank j
Pst     (i,j )OUT
Bank k Bank i
Pst (i,j )IN
Figure 2 shows the aggregate values and volumes of daily payments made in
CHAPS as well as the values and volumes of payments made on behalf of second-tier
banks. Aggregate payment values are in the range £139 billion–£426 billion between
2011 and 2016, while payment volumes fluctuate between 60 000 and 90 000 mes-
sages daily. Payments on behalf of second-tier banks are almost half of total pay-
ments, which is indicative of the high degree of tiering in CHAPS. It is noteworthy
that payments on behalf of second-tier banks do not appear to change after each of
the de-tiering events. This is mainly because, to a large extent, the new first-tier banks
continue to make payments via their correspondent banks.
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, we define and calculate the metrics of credit, liquidity and operational
risks associated with tiering and study the impact that the five de-tiering events had on
the magnitude of these risks. In theory, the degree of tiering should be related to the
credit, liquidity and operational risks borne by first- and second-tier banks as follows.
(1) A less tiered structure should decrease credit risk. This is because when a
first-tier CHAPS bank makes (receives) a payment on behalf of a second-tier
client, it does so without immediately receiving (sending) any funds from (to)
its second-tier client. Instead, all dues are netted at the end of the day. This
Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures www.risk.net/journals
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FIGURE 2 CHAPS daily payment values and volumes.
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(a) Daily payment values (in £ billions). (b) Daily payment volumes (in thousands of payments). The blue (upper)
lines show total values and volumes, while the pink (lower) lines show values and volumes of payments made on
behalf of second-tier client banks.The sample period is September 2010 to February 2016.The vertical lines indicate
de-tiering events.
effectively creates an intraday exposure between the banks of the two tiers,
which means that should one bank default during the day, the other is liable to
potential losses arising from this exposure. This is akin to the credit risk that
arises in deferred net settlement payment systems as formalized in Kahn and
Roberds (1998). Thus, we should observe a reduction in credit risk after each
of the de-tiering events in our sample.
(2) A less tiered structure should increase liquidity cost. First, this is because of
payment pooling. In a tiered structure, any funds received by a first-tier bank
on behalf of its clients can be used intraday to fund outgoing payments of the
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first-tier bank that are made on behalf of either itself or another client bank.
This means that the first-tier bank will have to deploy less of its own liquidity
(in the form of reserves and collateral posted with the Bank of England) to
meet its payment obligations. Thus, forcing payments to flow only between
fewer (first-tier) banks effectively creates a liquidity pool that can be utilized
by first-tier banks to make other CHAPS payments. Second, it is possible for
first-tier banks to internalize payments that are made between two of its clients.
This means that a payment between client A and client B of the same CHAPS
first-tier bank can be settled outside of CHAPS by making a book entry in
the balance sheet of the first-tier correspondent bank and without needing to
deploy liquidity. Finally, any payments due between a correspondent bank and
its clients are netted, which means that the amount of liquidity used is less than
what would have been used if the client banks had been direct participants.
These effects have previously been identified in simulation studies (see, for
example, Adams et al 2010) and suggest that the amount and cost of liquidity
used should rise after each of the de-tiering events.
(3) A less tiered structure should decrease operational risk resulting from individ-
ual bank outages. This is primarily because tiering creates operational depen-
dencies. When a first-tier bank experiences an outage and, as a result, cannot
make (or receive) payments, neither can its second-tier clients. In other words,
individual bank outages at the first tier affect second-tier banks’ ability to make
or receive payments.8 However, a more tiered payment system should cope
better against a system-wide outage, whereby no first-tier bank can send or
receive payments. This is because, in a more tiered structure, a larger number
of payments are internalized and are therefore not reliant on LVPS access.
In what follows, we empirically test these hypotheses and attempt to quantify the
associated risks.
4.1 Credit risk
Credit risk between first- and second-tier banks arises when banks extend intraday
credit to each other. The risk materializes if/when a bank fails to pay the (netted)
8 As shown by Bech and Garratt (2012), banks may react strategically to a widespread operational
outage by withholding their liquidity until the outage is resolved. In this paper, we do not examine
the liquidity implications of operational incidents, given that Benos et al (2012) estimate this cost
to be small in CHAPS and that we do a separate analysis of overall liquidity usage around the
de-tiering events.
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amounts due at the end of the business day. Credit risk arises for both first- and
second-tier institutions.9
 First-tier banks usually offer intraday overdraft facilities to their client banks
when making outward payments on their behalf. This creates credit risk for
first-tier banks, since, in case of a client bank default, the first-tier bank loses
any intraday credit provided.
 Conversely, a second-tier bank is exposed to its settlement bank when it holds
positive intraday balances with it. This happens when the first-tier bank receives
more payments than it sends on behalf of its second-tier client. In this case, a
default by the first-tier bank could result in the loss of any positive balances in
the client’s account.
For any first-tier bank that has one or more clients joining the first tier, we expect
its credit risk to decrease, all else being equal, simply because de-tiering reduces the
number of its second-tier clients. Similarly, the intraday credit exposures of a second-
tier bank to its settlement bank(s) should be reduced once the second-tier bank joins
the first tier. These exposures will not necessarily become zero, as the joining bank
may still choose to obtain intraday credit from its former first-tier correspondent(s).10
To quantify the credit risk that arises between first- and second-tier banks, we make
the following assumptions.
(a) Any payments due between first- and second-tier banks are paid off at the end
of the business day. To our knowledge, this is precisely how dues between first-
and second-tier CHAPS banks are settled.
(b) Intraday credit between first- and second-tier banks is mostly unsecured. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that this is indeed the case between first- and second-tier
banks. To the extent that intraday credit is collateralized, the intraday exposures
that we calculate are an overestimate of the loss given default (LGD).
(c) For each bank, there cannot be multiple simultaneous counterparty defaults. We
make this assumption because, in practice, the likelihood of multiple same-day
defaults is extremely low.
Apart from examining how intraday exposures change as a result of de-tiering, we
quantify credit risk by calculating what it would cost a bank to insure itself against
any losses arising from these exposures. In doing so, we assume that the price of
9 Of course, intraday credit risk may also arise between first-tier banks. For example, Jurgilas and
Zikes (2014) document a positive price for unsecured intraday credit among CHAPS banks.
10 The joining bank will also still be exposed to their clients, which were previously on the third tier
and are now on the second tier. These exposures will not change as a result of a de-tiering event.
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insurance is actuarially fair in the sense that it equals the expected cost to the insurer.
Under this (mild) assumption, the insurance premium is equal to the expected value
of the loss, and a risk-averse bank will want to fully insure any potential losses (see
Mas-Colell et al 1995, pp. 187–188).
Therefore, the expected cost of credit risk will equal the cost of insuring against
any losses that arise as a result of intraday exposures if/when a counterparty fails. In
particular, for each bank i , the sterling expected cost of its credit risk on day s will be
EŒCredit Risk Costis D LGDis  IPs; (4.1)
where LGD is the loss given default and IP is the insurance premium. On aggregate,
the expected credit risk cost on day s will then be
EŒCredit Risk Costs D
X
i
EŒCredit Risk Costis; (4.2)
where the sum is across all (or a subset of) the banks in the system. The daily LGD is a
function of the intraday exposures between banks. We next estimate these exposures,
both for first- and second-tier banks.11
4.1.1 Intraday exposures between first- and second-tier banks
One way to estimate the LGD of a first-tier bank i in the case of a second-tier bank j
default on day s is via the (time-weighted) average intraday credit exposure of bank i
to its client j on that day. This is the time average net debit position of bank i versus
bank j :
Avg_Exposureijs D
1
N
X
t2T
maxfP OUTst .i; j /  P INst .i; j /; 0g; (4.3)
where P OUT=INst .i; j / is the cumulative amount paid/received by first-tier bank i on
behalf of bank j on day s and up until time t ; T D ft1; : : : ; tN g is a time partition of
the business day; and N is the number of time intervals in the partition.12 An upper
bound for the LGD is the maximum credit exposure of bank i to bank j on day s:
Max_Exposureijs D max
t2T fmaxfP
OUT
st .i; j /  P INst .i; j /; 0gg: (4.4)
These maximum exposures are typically short-lived; so while they are indicative of
the potential intraday credit risks that might arise, they are economically less relevant
than the average intraday exposures.
11 For computational convenience, we do this using only payments that are larger than £10 million.
After applying this threshold, we are still able to capture around 90% of the total daily value of
payments made.
12 In our case, there are N D 9 hourly intervals.
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Given our assumption of at most one counterparty defaulting on any given day, we
calculate for each bank i the maximum, across all of its second-tier clients, of the
above two metrics:
Avg_Exposureis D max
j
fAvg_Exposureijsg;
Max_Exposureis D max
j
fMax_Exposureijsg: (4.5)
In using maximums to calculate daily exposures, we conservatively assume that the
defaulting second-tier bank is the one to which the first-tier correspondent has the
largest intraday exposure.
We then calculate in a similar manner the credit risk that accrues to second-tier
banks. Letting P IN=OUTst .i; j / be defined as before, the average and maximum credit
exposures of second-tier bank j to its settlement bank i on day s are
Avg_Exposureijs D
1
N
X
t2T
maxfP INst .i; j /  P OUTst .i; j /; 0g;
Max_Exposureijs D max
t2T maxfP
IN
st .i; j /  P OUTst .i; j /; 0g; (4.6)
where T D ft1; t2; : : : ; tN g is again a partition of the business day.
Given that some second-tier banks have multiple first-tier correspondents, we take,
as before, the maximum bilateral exposure across all first-tier institutions associated
with second-tier bank j :
Avg_Exposureis D max
j
fAvg_Exposureijsg;
Max_Exposureis D max
j
fMax_Exposureijsg: (4.7)
To estimate the magnitude of intraday exposure changes following each of the de-
tiering events, we estimate the following panel specification separately for affected
first- and second-tier banks:
Exposureis D a C b Eventis C c SONIAs C ui C eis; (4.8)
where i denotes banks, s denotes days, “Exposure” is any of the variables defined
in (4.5) and (4.7), “Event” is a bank-specific de-tiering event dummy, and SONIA
(sterling overnight index average) is the effective reference overnight rate for unse-
cured transactions in the sterling market. In this setup, the coefficient of interest is b.
Negative values of b would suggest a decline in intraday exposures arising between
first- and second-tier banks.
In Table 3, we report the results of this estimation. In columns (1)–(4), we report
results for first-tier banks that had one of their second-tier clients joining the first tier.
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The estimated coefficients of the de-tiering event dummy are generally negative, and
their significance tends to increase with the inclusion of controls. Also, they tend to be
larger for Max_Exposure, which is consistent with expectations, since it is typically
the largest clients that join the first tier. In terms of magnitudes, they suggest that daily
intraday exposures drop on a daily basis by £0.3 billion–£1.1 billion, on average, for
each of the affected first-tier banks, and depending on whether one measures average
or maximum intraday exposures. In columns (5)–(8), we report results for the second-
tier banks that join the first tier. The coefficients of the de-tiering event dummy are
again negative but only borderline significant. Further, they are larger in magnitude
than those of first-tier banks. The estimated coefficients suggest that second-tier bank
intraday exposures drop by £1.46 billion–£2.7 billion daily on average for each bank,
although this cannot be strongly statistically associated with the de-tiering events.
4.1.2 Estimating the cost of credit risk
We next estimate the expected cost of credit risk, as per (4.2), that arises as a result of
the intraday exposures between first- and second-tier banks. We use the average daily
CDS spread of the CHAPS banks as a proxy of the premium (IP) required to insure
any losses associated with a bank’s default. For this, we use the price of the five-year
contract, as this is the most liquid term. In averaging the CDS spreads, we also assume
that the insurance premium is the same across institutions. We note that CDS spreads
involve an implicit assumption about the recovery rate, and that this assumption may
yield different spreads than, for example, those obtained directly from credit rating
implied probabilities. Another caveat to the use of CDS spreads is that they reflect
the market’s risk appetite, rather than the risk appetite of the regulator. While we
are aware of these limitations, we believe they are unlikely to change the order of
magnitude of the effect that we wish to quantify. Thus, we estimate the insurance
premium as
IPs D 1
I
X
i2I
CDSis; (4.9)
where I is the number of CHAPS banks for which there is a traded CDS contract,
and CDSis is the daily annualized spread of the five-year contract of bank i .
To calculate the change in the cost of intraday credit risk, we multiply each of the
estimated “Event” dummy coefficients from Table 3 with the time average, minimum
and maximum daily values of the insurance premium. These cost changes, expressed
in £ thousands per bank, per day, are shown in Table 4. As one can see, the reduction
in the expected costs of the intraday exposures between first- and second-tier banks,
as a result of reduced tiering, averages between £11 000 and £135 000 per bank, per
day (first row). This cost reduction is higher for second-tier banks, since these also
experience the largest reductions in intraday exposures after they join the first tier. In
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annual terms, the reduction in costs as shown in the first row, for example, amounts
to anywhere between £2.9 million and £33.7 million for each bank. The numbers
corresponding to the minimum/maximum CDS spreads observed during our sample
period (0.53% and 2.94%, respectively) constitute a lower/upper bound for these
cost reductions, since we effectively assume that every day in our sample period the
insurance premium attains its minimum/maximum value. Again, depending on the
way the intraday exposures are calculated, the associated daily cost reductions are at
least as high as between £6700 and £57 500 and at most as high as between £27 000
and £319 000 per bank on a daily basis.13
We finally look at system-wide intraday exposures (and their associated costs)
arising across all CHAPS banks, so as to get a better sense of the overall magnitude
of these costs. For this, we add up all the individual bank average and maximum
intraday exposures as defined in (4.5) and (4.7):
Avg_Exposures D
X
i2FT
Avg_Exposureis C
X
j2ST
Avg_Exposurejs;
Max_Exposures D
X
i2FT
Max_Exposureis C
X
j2ST
Max_Exposurejs; (4.10)
where FT and ST denote the sets of all first- and second-tier banks.14 We also calcu-
late the daily expected costs of the system-wide intraday exposures at the prevailing
insurance premiums by multiplying the system-wide exposures with the cross-bank
average CDS spread:
EŒCredit Risk Costs D Exposures  IPs; (4.11)
where “Exposure” is either “Avg_Exposure” or “Max_Exposure”. Figure 3 plots the
daily aggregate intraday exposures that arise between all first- and second-tier banks,
along with the average daily annualized, five-year CDS spread and the product of
the two, which, as per (4.11), is our estimate of the daily cost of insuring against
a potential loss.15 As is evident from Figure 3(c), the aggregate cost of insurance
fluctuates between £1 million and £6 million daily for all banks in aggregate (or
£250 million–£1.5 billion annually). The effect of the de-tiering events is less visible
here, both because this calculation also includes (first- and second-tier) banks that
were not affected by the events and because overall costs are largely driven by the
prevailing CDS spreads.
13 Annually, this cost reduction is between £1.2 million and £14.4 million at minimum and
£6.8 million and £79.8 million at maximum for each bank.
14 The sets are adjusted after each de-tiering event to include the new first-tier banks and exclude
them from the second tier.
15 In other words, it is the amount that all banks collectively would have to pay every day to insure
themselves against losses arising from their intraday exposures.
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FIGURE 3 Daily aggregate intraday exposures, daily average CDS spread (%, annualized)
and daily expected cost of credit risk.
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(a) Aggregate daily intraday credit exposure (Avg_Exposures and Max_Exposures ) arising between all first- and
second-tier institutions. Avg_Exposures and Max_Exposures are defined in (4.10). (b) Average daily CDS spread
across CHAPS banks (%, annualized). (c) Aggregate expected daily cost of credit risk (in £ millions) as per (4.11),
as calculated using Avg_Exposure (blue line) and Max_Exposure (red dotted line). The vertical lines denote the
de-tiering events. The time period is from September 20, 2010 to February 12, 2016.
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4.2 Liquidity cost
When a first-tier bank assumes a net debit position (ie, pays more than it receives),
it deploys its own liquidity to make up the difference. To make payments in those
instances, the bank may either use its own reserves or borrow intraday from the Bank of
England on a collateralized basis. In either case, deploying one’s own liquidity has an
opportunity cost, because reserves and collateral could potentially be used elsewhere
and be remunerated. Therefore, the cost of own liquidity usage is the opportunity
cost associated with reserves and collateral held by CHAPS banks for the purpose
of meeting their payment obligations. As we explained earlier, de-tiering should in
theory lead to higher liquidity costs both because there is less opportunity for first-tier
banks to recycle clients’ incoming payments, in order to make their own payments
(pooling), and because there is less scope for settling payment obligations between
clients of the same first-tier bank on the latter’s books rather than through CHAPS
(internalization). In this section, we assess the impact of the de-tiering events in our
sample on the cost of liquidity usage among CHAPS banks.
Based on the above discussion, the liquidity cost of first-tier bank i on day s is
Liquidity Cost.£/is D Liquidity Deployedis  Opportunity Costs; (4.12)
where “Liquidity Deployed” is a function of the bank’s net debit positions attained
during the day. The aggregate liquidity cost across all CHAPS banks is then
Aggr: Liquidity Cost.£/s D
X
i
Liquidity Cost.£/is; (4.13)
where the sum is over all first-tier banks active on day s.
The resources that banks hold to meet their daily liquidity needs are used whenever
the cumulative amount of outgoing payments exceeds that of incoming payments.
Given that these resources are pledged for the entire day, the amount of liquidity
deployed by a CHAPS bank equals the maximum net debit position attained during
the day, regardless of whether this liquidity is deployed for only a brief period of time.
Thus, if P OUT=INist is the cumulative amount paid/received by first-tier bank i on day s
and up to time t , the liquidity deployed by this bank is then
Liquidity Deployedis D max
t
fmaxfP OUTist  P INist ; 0gg: (4.14)
It is worth noting here that the deployed liquidity is calculated using all first-tier bank
payments, ie, the payments made/received on its own behalf as well as those made/
received on behalf of its clients.16
16 Second-tier banks do not use any of their own liquidity to make payments, since they have no
access to CHAPS. All of the liquidity required for their payments is provided for by their first-
tier correspondents. Further, first-tier correspondents can choose when, during the day, to make
a payment on behalf of a second-tier bank, unless that payment is time sensitive. First-tier banks
choose the timing of these payments to minimize liquidity usage.
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FIGURE 4 Frequency distribution of daily deployed liquidity (in £ billions) before and after
the de-tiering events by each of those first-tier banks with a client who joins the first tier.
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To ease visualization, deployed liquidity has been truncated at £8 billion in this chart. There are only nine instances
in our sample of deployed liquidity that is greater than £8 billion, representing less than 0.16% of the frequency
distribution.The maximum deployed liquidity is £16.85 billion.The sample period is September 20, 2010 to February
12, 2016.
To assess the impact of de-tiering on the cost of liquidity, we first look at the
deployed liquidity of those first-tier banks that had a client joining the first tier.
Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of daily deployed liquidity across each of
the affected first-tier banks before and after the de-tiering events. Figure 4 shows that
after the de-tiering events, affected first-tier banks seem to be using more of their
own liquidity, which is consistent with what one would expect. For example, while
– prior to the de-tiering events – affected first-tier banks do not deploy any of their
own liquidity about 35% of the time, this number drops to 25% after the de-tiering
events. However, the overall amounts of deployed liquidity are generally small. Aside
from the fact that on about 30% of all days (before and after the de-tiering events),
affected banks do not deploy any liquidity at all, even when they do deploy their
own liquidity, the amount used rarely exceeds £5 billion per bank. These amounts
are small compared with the average daily payments of about £43 billion that each of
these banks makes.
To more formally assess the impact of de-tiering on liquidity usage and costs, we
next estimate a panel fixed-effects model of deployed liquidity across these affected
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first-tier banks:
LIQDEPLis D a C b Eventis C c Pmtsis C d SONIAs C ui C eis: (4.15)
As before, i denotes banks, s denotes days, LIQDEPL is the amount of liquidity
deployed as defined in (4.14), “Event” is the bank-specific de-tiering event dummy,
“Pmts” is the amount of payments made by each bank and SONIA is the sterling
overnight index average rate.17 The last two variables are included as controls, as
one would expect the amount of liquidity used to be higher with payments made and
lower with the interbank borrowing cost.
It is also worth noting that any effects on the liquidity usage of those first-tier banks
with joining clients would primarily be because of the absence of pooling, as these
banks would not be able to use the incoming payments of their joining clients after
each of the de-tiering events. Internalization should not affect these first-tier banks, as
the onus is primarily on the joining second-tier clients to supply the liquidity required
for their own payments.
Table 5 shows the results of this estimation. As one can see from the estimated
coefficients of the “Event” dummy, while de-tiering is associated with increased
amounts of deployed liquidity by affected first-tier banks, the effect is not statistically
significant. This could be because the high degree of tiering gives first-tier banks
access to alternative client liquidity even after one of their bigger clients has joined
the first tier. Such an explanation would be consistent with the large number of days
with zero liquidity usage that we observe. Alternatively, it could be because the banks
joining the first tier have similar payment patterns with the other second-tier banks,
so there is limited pooling of offsetting flows in the first place.18 The other control
variables are also statistically insignificant.
We also look at the impact of the de-tiering events on aggregate liquidity usage,
which is the sum of the liquidity usage of all first-tier banks. We do this because we
want to capture any additional effects of de-tiering on deployed liquidity arising from
reduced internalization. Figure 5 shows the amounts of aggregate liquidity deployed
by those banks that are consistently on the first tier during our sample time (ie,
excluding the joining banks) as well as of all banks that are on the first tier at any
point in time. Legacy first-tier banks deploy less of their own liquidity over time, but
this appears to be partly offset by the liquidity that new entrants deploy. As a result,
and despite daily fluctuations between £10 billion and £20 billion, deployed liquidity
across all banks remains relatively stable during our sample time. The de-tiering
17 In one case, a single first-tier bank was affected by two de-tiering events. In that case, this dummy
takes the value 1 only after the second de-tiering event. It ignores the first de-tiering because it
happened very early in our sample period.
18 We thank Peter Zimmerman for this observation.
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TABLE 5 CHAPS bank own liquidity usage around de-tiering events.
Liquidity deployed (LIQDEPL)‚ …„ ƒ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event 0.0325 0.0830 0.1650 0.2594
(0.12) (0.45) (0.46) (0.94)
SONIA 1.2929 2.1797
(0.55) (0.79)
Pmts 0.0267 0.0286
(1.84) (1.81)
Const 1.0789*** 0.4620 0.1277 1.2526
(11.04) (0.45) (0.19) (0.83)
R2 0.000 0.002 0.023 0.027
N 5460 5460 5460 5460
events do not appear to be associated with sizable changes in aggregate deployed
liquidity.19
To quantify the cost of liquidity usage by CHAPS banks, we use the overnight index
average (SONIA) rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of own liquidity usage. The
rationale is that the liquidity used to make payments could be alternatively loaned out
in the interbank market. Figure 6 plots the SONIA rate over our sample period and the
daily aggregate cost of deploying liquidity, as calculated by (4.13). The figure shows
that this cost fluctuates between £15 000 and £40 000 daily for all CHAPS banks.
Overall, de-tiering does not seem to have had a sizable effect on the amounts
of deployed liquidity of first-tier banks, while the associated cost of deploying this
liquidity appears, in any case, to be relatively small.
4.3 Operational risk
Finally, we attempt to assess and quantify the amount of operational risk associated
with the tiered structure of CHAPS. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2011) defines operational risk as the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, from human error or from external events. This definition includes
legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk. In our analysis, we are concerned
19 We also formally test this in time series regressions. The regression results confirm the absence of
any significant effects of de-tiering on aggregate liquidity usage. The regression results are available
upon request.
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FIGURE 5 Aggregate liquidity deployed (in £ billions) of legacy first-tier banks, and of all
banks.
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(a) Legacy first-tier banks. (b) All first-tier banks. Aggregate liquidity deployed is the sum of individual CHAPS
bank deployed liquidity as defined in (4.14). The vertical lines denote de-tiering events. The time period is from
September 20, 2010 to February 12, 2016.
about the risk of individual first-tier banks’ operational outages.20 When a first-tier
20 We do not consider outages of the entire payment system where all first-tier institutions are
affected. If anything, a less tiered system is more vulnerable to a system-wide outage, as there is
less scope for payments across second-tier banks to be internalized.
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FIGURE 6 SONIA (in %, annualized) and daily aggregate liquidity cost (in £ thousands).
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(a) SONIA (%). (b) Actual liquidity cost.Aggregate liquidity cost is defined in (4.13).The vertical lines denote de-tiering
events. The time period is from September 20, 2010 to February 12, 2016.
bank experiences an operational outage that prevents it from sending payments to
or receiving payments from other banks, the second-tier clients of the stricken bank
would also not be able to make payments to or receive payments from any other
banks that are not clients of the same stricken bank. Thus, as tiering decreases, an
operational outage at the first tier would affect fewer banks in the second tier, but the
probability of observing an outage on any particular day will increase.
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We measure the cost of operational risk as the expected opportunity cost of the
delayed payments that accrues to the banks receiving these payments. In focusing on
the opportunity cost of delayed payments, we make the following assumptions.
(a) During an outage, a stricken bank may receive but not send payments (poten-
tially becoming what is known as a liquidity sink). This is consistent with the
CHAPS outage record, where about 90% of observed outages involve banks
that cannot make payments but can receive them.
(b) No defaults can occur as a result of payment delays associated with an outage.
In other words, if a bank fails to make a payment because of an outage, then
we assume that this bank will not be forced into default by the bank expect-
ing to receive that payment. We assume that, in those instances, any binding
contractual obligations can be renegotiated. This assumption is based on the
observation that no bank in the United Kingdom has so far been driven into
default because of an operational incident.
(c) There is neither a reputational cost nor any gain whatsoever to the sender of a
delayed payment. While reputational costs may exist, we abstract away from
them in our analysis, as they are hard to quantify.
(d) Payments on behalf of second-tier banks are uniformly distributed during the
day so that only the duration (and not the time) of the outage matters. This
assumption is justified by the use of throughput rules in CHAPS, where banks
must, on average over the course of each month, make at least 50% of their
outgoing payments by noon and 75% of their payments by 14:30.
We note that the degree of tiering is unrelated to the cost incurred by the counterparty
of a first-tier bank whose own payments are delayed because of an operational outage.
For this reason, we only consider delays in payments by first-tier banks that are made
on behalf of their second-tier clients.
4.3.1 The expected cost of operational risk
As mentioned above, to calculate the expected cost of operational risk, we only con-
sider delayed payments by first-tier banks that are made on behalf of their second-tier
clients. Let P OUTsT .i; j / be the cumulative amount of payments made by bank i on
behalf of bank j on day s. In addition, let QXi be the random number of outages that
affect bank i on each day, let QD be the random duration of each outage expressed
in fractions of a business day and let rs be the daily cost of overnight unsecured
borrowing as captured by the SONIA rate. Then, an estimate of the daily expected
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TABLE 6 Summary statistics of daily expected costs of operational risk (in £ thousands)
as per (4.17).
Statistics 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Mean 7.7 8.4 8.4 5.9 3.2 9.7 14.7
Standard deviation 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.3 1.1 1.5
Minimum 4.6 5.9 5.6 4.2 1.6 6.4 10.4
Maximum 10.3 12.6 11.3 8.5 4.2 13.2 18.1
opportunity cost that accrues to the recipients of payments that are being delayed
because of an outage at bank i on day s is
EŒOperational Risk Costis D
 X
j
P OUTsT .i; j /

 . NXi  ND/  .rs  ND/; (4.16)
where NXi and ND are the means of QXi and QD, respectively.21 This expression effectively
calculates the fraction of total daily payments that is subject to delays and multiplies
it by the opportunity cost that corresponds to the expected time delay. The daily
aggregate expected cost of operational risk across all first-tier banks is the sum of the
individual bank expected costs:
EŒOperational Risk Costs D
X
i
EŒOperational Risk Costis: (4.17)
We calculate this expression using data on daily payments and on the number
and duration of operational outages among CHAPS banks, which is collected and
maintained by the Bank of England. The average number of outages and their durations
are estimated every year to account for any changes in these means as a result of the
de-tiering events during our sample time.
Table 6 shows summary statistics of the daily values of the expected cost of oper-
ational outage, as per (4.17), for each of the years in our sample. On average, the
expected aggregate opportunity cost of delayed payments fluctuates between £3 000
and £15 000 daily, an economically small amount. Further, this cost is not declining
(or increasing) over time, so it appears to be unrelated to the degree of tiering in
CHAPS. Given the small size of this effect, we forgo a more formal statistical test of
changes in the cost of operational risk after each of the de-tiering events.
In conclusion, given the assumptions stated at the beginning of this section, it
appears that the overall economic effect of payment delays associated with operational
risk is small. Further, de-tiering does not seem to have any impact on this cost.
21 This expression implicitly assumes that the payments are uniformly distributed throughout the
day.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we use data from CHAPS, the UK LVPS, to study the impact of corre-
spondent banking (known as tiering) on credit, liquidity and operational risk as well
as the economic significance of these risks. To this end, we exploit five de-tiering
events that occurred in CHAPS over the past several years. As such, ours is the first
study to capture actual (rather than simulated) effects associated with changes in a
tiered payment structure.
Our results suggest that the CHAPS de-tiering events in our sample bring about a
reduction in the intraday exposures between first- and second-tier banks to the order
of £0.3 billion to £1.5 billion per bank. While these numbers are not trivial, there
are several reasons why they are not larger. First, when moving to the first tier, most
banks continue, to some degree, to obtain (and supply) intraday credit from (to) their
former corresponding banks. Second, because of our assumption that at most one
second-tier client may default on a given day, we calculate the intraday exposures of
first-tier banks as the maximum of their exposures across their second-tier clients. This
assumption implies that even after a client bank joins the first tier, its correspondent
will still be exposed to what used to be the second-largest client. Thus, in instances
where the client banks are of similar size, the correspondent’s exposure to its single
largest client may not change substantially.
The cost of credit risk is estimated by the cost of insuring against the losses arising
from any intraday exposures toward a defaulting correspondent or second-tier bank.
Given the reduction in exposures, the cost of insuring against losses arising from these
exposures also drops. For average intraday exposures, we estimate this cost reduction
to be between £4 million and £19 million per bank, per year.
We also find that the effect of de-tiering on the amount and cost of bank-deployed
liquidity is small, where the cost of liquidity is approximated by the opportunity cost
of holding liquid assets. The effect is small firstly because the actual amounts of
deployed liquidity in CHAPS are modest (presumably due to payment recycling) and
do not change much after the de-tiering events, and secondly because the opportunity
cost of holding liquid assets is low over our sample period.
Finally, we find that the opportunity cost incurred by the recipients of payments
that are delayed, because of operational incidents, is also small. This suggests that
the operational risk accruing because of tiering is economically small. We should
mention, however, that in assessing the impact of a tiered structure on operational
risk, we assume that such unintentional payment delays do not result in contractual
obligations being breached or payers being forced into default by their counterparties.
Although it is not clear if the above effects would be smaller or larger if CHAPS
were to be further de-tiered, our findings do suggest that the tiered structure of CHAPS
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is primarily associated with intraday credit risk; otherwise, it does not appear to be
associated with substantial liquidity or operational risks.
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